I. INTRODUCTION
In the opening scenes of Director Steven Spielberg's Indiana Jones and the Last Crusade, the movie's namesake hero, a young Indiana Jones fights to reclaim a long-lost golden crucifix, once owned by 16th century Spanish explorer Francisco Vázquez de Coronado, from a thief. However, unlike Jones' attempt to keep the artifact from a thief, the court kept American victims of terrorist activity from seizing the tablets in order to satisfy legal judgments won against Iran. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 ("FSIA") generally provides immunity from suit to foreign sovereigns, as well as immunity from attachment of their property in executing U.S. court judgments against them. 9 However, FSIA provides limited exceptions to such immunity if the sovereign in question sponsored terrorist activity that is the basis of an American plaintiff's claim against them. 10 If an exception applies, plaintiffs may attach property that belongs to the foreign sovereign and is located within the jurisdiction of American courts.
11
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have disagreed over the proper interpretation of the statute applying the state-sponsored terror exception to the usual immunity from attachment, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g). 12 While the Ninth Circuit held in Bennett that § 1610(g) is a "freestanding immunity exception," allowing terror victims to attach "any and all Iranian property [located] in the United States," a panel of the Seventh Circuit disagreed. 13 In Rubin, the Seventh Circuit panel countered that § 1610(g) simply makes it easier for victims to seize particular "commercial use" property, designated elsewhere in § 1610, but not any kind of Iranian property they 5 . See, e.g., Bennett v 14 The panel's decision created a circuit split and sought to overrule two prior Seventh Circuit cases, creating a novel procedural issue outside the scope of this Comment. 15 The circuit split between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits is becoming increasingly prominent in the United States' foreign affairs. With the recent passing of the Justice Against State Sponsors of Terror Act ("JASTA"), Saudi Arabia is now considered a sponsor of terrorist acts occurring on U.S. soil for supporting the September 11th terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. 16 JASTA provides victims of the attacks and their families a cause of action to sue Saudi Arabia for damages. 17 With a growing number of potential plaintiffs able to bring 14. Rubin, 830 F.3d at 473-74. 15. Because the majority panel opinion in Rubin "both create [d] a circuit split and overrule [d] , in part, two recent decisions" of the Seventh Circuit, the Circuit's procedural Rule 40(e) would normally be triggered. Rubin, 830 F.3d at 489 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). Rule 40(e) requires that:
[a] proposed opinion approved by a panel of [the Seventh Circuit] adopting a position which would overrule a prior decision of this court or create a conflict between or among circuits shall not be published unless it is first circulated among the active members of this court and a majority of them do not vote to rehear en banc the issue of whether the position should be adopted. 7TH CIR. R. 40(e). In this case, however, five active judges, a majority, recused themselves, making it "impossible to hear [the] case en banc" or even to circulate the opinion as required. Rubin, 830 F.3d at 489 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). Neither the panel, nor Judge Hamilton, in dissent, indicated why the judges recused themselves, but "at least three of them have close ties to the University of Chicago. politics/senate-votes-to-override-obama-veto-on-9-11-victims-bill.html?_r=0. President Obama called the bill a "dangerous precedent" and a "mistake," indicating that the Act's potential aftermath could be harmful to diplomatic relations between the U.S. and a number of foreign entities. Id.; see infra note 217 and accompanying text. lawsuits under FSIA's terrorism exceptions, the need to clarify the scope of attachable property in these suits is more pressing than ever.
This Comment addresses the appropriate application of § 1610(g). Based on statutory construction, legislative intent, the propriety of overruling Seventh Circuit precedent, and public policy concerns, courts should not interpret § 1610(g) of FSIA as a freestanding immunity exception for attachment of any property belonging to state sponsors of terrorism. Instead, Courts should follow the Seventh Circuit and interpret § 1610(g) to ease the attachment requirements for certain property which has a "commercial use," as designated elsewhere in § 1610.
18
Part II of this Comment will provide background information relevant to examining the Ninth and Seventh Circuits' conflicting interpretations of § 1610(g). Part III will analyze both decisions and argue that federal courts should adopt the Seventh Circuit's understanding of § 1610(g), as described in Rubin, because of the statute's language and principles of statutory construction, legislative intent, and public policy concerns. Finally, Part IV will describe the ways the Seventh Circuit's decision could be implemented in the future.
II. BACKGROUND
Like any story of artifact seizure or protection, the history of the Bennet and Rubin cases and laws governing both is multi-faceted and full of twists, turns, and pitfalls. This part will introduce the practice of foreign sovereign immunity and the history of protecting international cultural property in the United States in Part II.A.1 and 2. Next, Part II.A.3 will explain the origins of FSIA and its statutory exceptions. Finally, Part II.B will discuss the Seventh and Ninth Circuits decisions creating a split over the function of FSIA § 1610(g), the state-sponsored terror exception to foreign sovereign immunity from the attachment of property to execute judgments made by U.S. courts.
A. Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Cultural Property, and FSIA in the U.S.
The History of Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the United States
Granting "foreign sovereign immunity" is the practice of allowing foreign nations or governments to avoid lawsuits filed against them in U.S. courts.
19
Providing foreign sovereigns immunity from American judicial proceedings is "a matter of grace and comity rather than a constitutional requirement," but has a longstanding history in the United States.
20
In 1812, Chief Justice John Marshall explained the purpose of providing foreign sovereign immunity: to maintain the "perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and th[e] common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an interchange of good offices with each other . . . ."
21
Congress did not formally regulate the practice of providing foreign sovereign immunity until the passage of the FSIA.
22
The FSIA formalized the general provisions of foreign immunity U.S. courts previously developed in the common law and included exceptions to granting immunity in particular circumstances. in the United States and around the world in many ways, particularly in the last several decades. This concept has long had appeal in American pop culture. 24 The U.S. government has also often manifested a strong desire to promote preservation and display of historical documents, sites, and cultural property, both at home, through entities like the National Archives, the Smithsonian Institution, and National Park Service, and abroad. temporarily loaned and imported to the United States for any non-profit "cultural exhibition, assembly, activity, or festival" hosted by any "educational institution" may be immune from "any judicial process" imposed by U.S. courts under particular conditions. 34 However, if these conditions are not met and the loaning state is deemed a sponsor of terror, plaintiffs may seek to attach cultural property under FSIA in support of execution of U.S. judgments. and "to free the Government from the case-by-case diplomatic pressures" that arose in the courts. 37 The FSIA dictates that foreign states, or their agencies and instrumentalities, are immune from the jurisdiction of both U.S. federal and state courts in almost all civil cases, but provides limited exceptions.
38
Section 1610 of FSIA designates exceptions to immunity from property attachment, including providing for "state-sponsored terrorism" exceptions.
39
FSIA's first state-sponsored terror exception to immunity was enacted in 1996. 40 The original version of the exception was repealed and replaced 34. 22 U.S.C. § 2459(a) (2012). To receive immunity under IFSA, the "President or his designee" must (1) find an object is "of cultural significance," (2) find that the activity within the U.S. is "in the national interest," and (3) publish a notice indicating the findings in the Federal Register prior to importing the object. Id. If these conditions are met, any cultural object temporarily within U.S. jurisdiction may be immune from attachment. Id 39. Exceptions to allowing state terror sponsors attachment immunity are 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(7) (2012) (state property "used for a commercial activity in the United States"), § 1610(b)(3) (pursuant to property of agencies or instrumentalities of state terror sponsors "engaged in commercial activity in the United States"), and § 1610(g) (as discussed in Part II.A.3.a.i). Other exceptions include § 1610(a)(1) (when a foreign state possessing property for commercial use waives their immunity), § 1610(a)(2) (when attached property "is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim [was] based"), § 1610(a)(3)-(4) (when claims are related to property rights), § 1610(a)(5) (when claims are based on contractual agreements), and § 1610(a)(6) (when arbitral awards are related to the attached property).
40. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 221, 110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (1996) . The statute allowed U.S. citizens who were victims of terrorist activity supported by foreign sovereigns to sue for compensatory damages based on their injuries. However, to clarify a number of issues and is now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A and referred to as the "Flatow Amendment," and was passed in response to a terror attack involving Iran. 41 The Flatow Amendment allows plaintiffs to seek punitive damages, along with compensatory damages, in suits against state terror sponsors.
42
These plaintiffs faced many procedural challenges in filing suits against Iran. 43 Even when plaintiffs were able to overcome the initial hurdles, most faced even more difficulty when attempting to recover their court ordered judgments. 44 The court in In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litigation attributed this difficulty to three primary factors: (1) the scarcity of "Iranian Government assets within the jurisdiction of United States Courts," (2) the immunity of many of the remaining Iranian assets located in the United States, and (3) the U.S. federal regulatory control of many of the assets attributed to state the statute did not specify whether it "served as a basis for an independent federal cause of action against foreign state sponsors of terrorism" themselves, or merely provided causes of action against state officials, employees, and agents of a foreign state; nor did it specify if parties with state-sponsored terror claims could seek compensatory and punitive damages. Receiving the judgment amount directly from the Iranian Government was improbable because the Government had never appeared in any FSIA terrorism action. 46 This led plaintiffs to "locate and attach Iranian Government assets in aid of execution of their civil judgments," a Herculean feat in light of the scarcity of such assets in the United States. 47 The scarcity of Iranian assets within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts arises primarily from the 1979 Iranian Hostage Crisis and its aftermath. 48 Most Iranian assets remaining in the United States after the resolution of the Crisis were "subject to a dizzying array of statutory and regulatory authorities," and with a tense political relationship between the United States and Iran, plaintiffs had few options for attachment. 
53
The Court held that 22 U.S.C. § 8772 made about $1.75 billion in Iranian assets held in a New York bank specifically available to "partially satisfy judgments gained in separate actions by over 1,000 victims of terrorist acts sponsored by Iran," including the plaintiffs in the Rubin case discussed in Section II.B.2.
54
While the defendants argued that § 8772 was unconstitutional for violating the separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches, the majority of the Court disagreed and upheld the legislation.
55
In effect, the Court's decision indicates that Congress may intervene to designate particular assets for attachment in cases related to victims of statesponsored terror.
56
The effect of Section 1083 of the 2008 NDAA was much broader than either TRIA Section 201 or Section 502 of the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act.
57
The primary results of Section 1083 were the re-codification of the Flatow Amendment as 28 U.S.C. § 1605A and the addition of language to § 1610, including subsection 1610(g), for "Property in Certain Actions." 58 The Flatow Amendment, or § 1605A, is the current exception to sovereign immunity for state sponsors of terrorism, and it expressly creates a federal cause of action allowing victims of terror to sue state sponsors of terror directly. 59 Generally, to file suit under § 1605A: (1) the terror victim must be a U.S. national, 60 (2) the nation sued must be recognized as a "state sponsor of terrorism" by the U.S. In addition to defining when plaintiffs may bring suits against state sponsors of terror, § 1605A(g) establishes a lien against certain property in judicial proceedings against the sued state as soon as plaintiffs file notice of the proceeding. 63 The lien is established against "any real property or tangible personal property" which is (1) subject to attachment in order to satisfy a judgment pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1610, (2) located within the judicial district of the filing, and (3) titled "in the name of any defendant," or essentially property of the foreign sovereign being sued. 64 Section 1610 includes exceptions to foreign immunity from attachment of assets in aid of execution of judgments entered by U.S. courts.
65
Congress intended to combat "the inability of plaintiffs to execute their civil judgments against Iran" by adding language to the section as part of the 2008 NDAA. 66 Section 1610(a) lists the kinds of attachable property used for "commercial activity" by terror sponsors on American soil, and most importantly denies immunity from attachment to such property when the judgment against the state relates to "claim[s] for which the foreign state is not immune under" the state-sponsored terror exception, § 1605A. 67 Section 1610(b)(3) also denies immunity from attachment to agencies or instrumentalities of states designated as sponsors of terror under § 1605A. 68 Several courts maintain that § 1610(b)(3) includes state instrumentalities generally considered "juridically separate," or apart from a state's underlying government for the purposes of suit, in order to "avoid the injustice that would result from (1) In general . . . the property of a foreign state against which a judgment is entered under section 1605A, and the property of an agency or instrumentality of such a state, including property that is a separate juridical entity or is an interest held directly or indirectly in a separate juridical entity, is subject to attachment in aid of execution, and execution, upon that judgment as provided in this section, regardless of-(A) the level of economic control over the property by the government of the foreign state; (B) whether the profits of the property go to that government; (C) the degree to which officials of that government manage the property or otherwise control its daily affairs; (D) whether that government is the sole beneficiary in interest of the property; or (E) whether establishing the property as a separate entity would entitle the foreign state to benefits in United States courts while avoiding its obligations. The Bancec doctrine created a "general presumption that a judgment against a foreign state may not be executed on property owned by a juridically separate agency or instrumentality," but included two distinct exceptions to this immunity when "the sovereign and its instrumentality are alter egos or if adherence to the rule of separateness would work an injustice." 75 In applying Bancec, courts created a list of five general factors to determine if an exception applied to a juridically separate agency or instrumentality. 76 Those factors include:
§ 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)-(II
(1) The level of economic control by the government;
(2) whether the entity's profits go to the government; (3) the degree to which government officials manage the entity or otherwise have a hand in its daily affairs; (4) whether the government is the real beneficiary of the entity's conduct; and (5) whether adherence to separate identities would entitle the foreign state to benefits in United States courts while avoiding its obligations. holders, who may be non-liable under the suit and inappropriately punished if certain property is seized.
80
In the past, § 1610(g) was consistently used by the courts to punish state sponsors of terrorism because it allows for the attachment of certain assets "regardless of factors that would ordinarily insulate such assets in other contexts governed by § 1610(a) or (b)
83
The Ninth Circuit held that § 1610(g) is a "freestanding exception" to immunity, making any property attachable under § 1610(g), regardless of the commercial use requirements of § 1610(a) and (b). In 2007, a district court ruled the Bennetts were entitled to almost thirteen million dollars in damages from Iran, based on Iran's role in the terror attack.
88
Over the next several years, the Bennetts unsuccessfully attempted to attach Iranian assets pursuant to the 2008 additions to FSIA § 1610 to satisfy their judgment.
89
These assets included the former Iranian Embassy, which the courts refused to attach for diplomatic reasons. Iran.
92
The district court held these funds were attachable under section 201(a) of TRIA, because the funds sought were frozen by the U.S. government, and under § 1610(g) of the FSIA.
93
The defendants, including Bank Melli, appealed to the Ninth Circuit, where a three-judge panel heard the appeal, two judges affirming the district court's ruling and one concurring in part and dissenting in part. The two judges affirming the district court first held that TRIA § 201(a) was an appropriate means to attach the funds sought because the funds were blocked by the U.S. government.
95
The court also held that Bank Melli, an "instrumentality" of Iran, was not immune to attachment because the underlying claim arose as a result of state-sponsored terror.
96
The majority next considered the potential attachment of the Visa and Franklin funds under § 1610(g).
97
While the panel in dicta "acknowledge [d] that § 1610 as a whole [was] ambiguous," it nevertheless held that § 1610(g) was a freestanding exception to immunity from attachment of assets in claims arising under § 1605A and incidents of state sponsored terror. 98 In effect, this holding would mean that any property of Iran, or an entity of Iran, is attachable under § 1610(g). The Ninth Circuit's interpretation markedly diverged with the United States', as amicus curiae, interpretation of § 1610(g).
99
The United States argued "section 1610(g) is not a freestanding exception to immunity that can be invoked independent of the rest of section 1610." 100 In other words, the United States argued that § 1610(g) simply eases the requirements for property attachable under other subsections of the rule, particularly § f a plaintiff covered by section 1610(g) wishes to attach the assets of a state agency or instrumentality, and the plaintiff can find an exception in section 1610 that would apply but for the fact that the plaintiff holds a judgment against the state itself-rather than an entity that would be considered legally distinct-the plaintiff would be able to proceed.").
100. See id. at 8. Vol. 66 1610(a) and (b) when the claims are against state terror sponsors.
101
Disagreeing with the United States' interpretation, the court first contended that "Congress was referring to, and abrogating," not only the presumption that instrumentalities were generally immune from suits against the state to which they were an instrumentality, but also the usual application of the Bancec factors to instrumentalities. 102 The majority held that § 1610(g) "contain[ed] a freestanding provision for attaching and executing against assets of a foreign state or its agencies or instrumentalities," regardless of the requirements of any other subsection of § 1610, including the requirements for revoking immunity for property used for, "commercial activity" in § 1610(a) and (b). 103 The court stated that § 1610(g) dealt with subject matter distinct from other parts of the section because "[ § 1610(g)] applies only to 'certain actions,' specifically, judgments 'entered under section 1605A. '" 104 Indicating "the particular . . . controls over the general," the panel thus held that by applying § 1610(g), attachments need not meet the "commercial use" requirements in subsections (a) or (b) and in effect, indicated that any property could be seized pursuant to § 1610(g), regardless of its characteristics of uses. 105 Next, the court determined that "as provided in this section" referred only "to procedures contained in" the subsection of § 1610 directly preceding § 1610(g), but not to § 1610 as a whole or other provisions within the FSIA.
106
The preceding subsection, § 1610(f), allows for the attachment of certain blocked assets of state sponsors of terror. 
108
In Gates, the Seventh Circuit held that § 1610(g) "allow[ed] attachment of a much broader range of assets to satisfy [ § 1605A related] judgments" than § 1610(a) or (b).
109
In Wyatt, the Seventh Circuit held that plaintiffs proceeding under § 1610(g) need not comply with the FSIA § 1608(e), which relates to attachment of foreign owned real estate in preferred mortgage foreclosures.
110
The Ninth Circuit majority also relied on "Congress' intention to make it easier for victims of terrorism to recover judgments," evidenced by statements made by one of the sponsors of the 2008 NDAA bill, Senator Frank Lautenberg.
111
In his partial dissent, Judge Dee V. Benson agreed that TRIA permitted the attachment of the funds at issue, but disagreed that § 1610(g) was a freestanding immunity exception. (2)(A) At the request of any party in whose favor a judgment has been issued with respect to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune under section 1605(a)(7) (as in effect before the enactment of section 1605A [enacted Jan. 28, 2008]) or section 1605A, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State should make every effort to fully, promptly, and effectively assist any judgment creditor or any court that has issued any such judgment in identifying, locating, and executing against the property of that foreign state or any agency or instrumentality of such state.
(B) In providing such assistance, the Secretaries-(i) may provide such information to the court under seal; and (ii) should make every effort to provide the information in a manner sufficient to allow the court to direct the United States Marshall's office to promptly and effectively execute against that property. (3) Waiver. The President may waive any provision of paragraph (1) 116 The initial suit was brought by or on behalf of eight U.S. citizens, including the Rubins, who were victims of Hamas suicide bombers in Jerusalem in September 1997. 117 The district court found these plaintiffs were entitled to a total $71.5 million default judgment, which Iran subsequently refused to pay. 118 Over the next thirteen years, plaintiffs from the Campunzo suit joined with the Rubins and attempted to satisfy their judgments by attaching Iranian assets, including collections of Persian antiquities in the possession of various American museums within the jurisdictions of the First and Seventh Circuits. 119 The First Circuit held that antiquities originating from Iran and housed at the Boston Museum of Fine Arts and Harvard University could not be attached because they did not qualify as property of Iran.
120
The Seventh Circuit, however, found that one collection of assets held at the University of Chicago's Oriental Institute, the Persepolis Collection, met the two threshold requirements for attachment under § 1610 of the FSIA.
121
The Persepolis Collection, also known as the Persepolis Fortification Archive ("the PFA"), arrived at the University of Chicago Oriental Institute in the mid-1930s, as a long-term loan from the Iranian Government for "study and analysis" at the Institute.
122
Consisting of tens of thousands of clay tablets and fragments, the PFA contains administrative records of the Persepolis region in southwestern Iran from approximately 500 B.C.
123
The records contain information about the "daily lives of ordinary people living in the Persian Empire" and were written primarily in the rarely studied Elamite language. 124 Counsel for the Rubin plaintiffs, David Strachman, indicated that he sought to attach, and then sell, the PFA tablets to help execute the judgment owed to the Rubins after reading about the research done by the Oriental Institute and their interactions with Iran. 125 However, others feared that selling the tablets and potentially breaking up the PFA collection would undermine their cultural significance.
126
In addition to harming the collection itself, Gil J. Stein, Director of the Oriental Institute, specified that attaching the PFA tablets could strain the tenuous relationship between the United States and Iran further and "do irrevocable harm to scholarly cooperation and cultural exchanges throughout the world." The Rubins and Iran differed on three primary points. First, the parties disagreed about whether the Oriental Institute was Iran's "agent" within the meaning of the statute and whether "studying and displaying the artifacts constitute[d] 'commercial activity'" and thus made them attachable under § 1610(a). 132 Second, the parties argued over the applicability of TRIA to certain collections at issue, which would render arguments about the use of § 1610(g) unnecessary. 133 Finally, the parties diverged over whether § 1610(g) was a freestanding exception to state sovereign immunity under the FSIA, allowing "execution against all terror states' assets" regardless of whether or not the assets also met the requirements of § 1610(a) or (b).
134
The court granted summary judgment in favor of the several defendants, including the University of Chicago and the Oriental Institute.
135
The court held "there [was] no evidence that the Institute may properly be considered an agent of Iran," denying attachment under § 1610(a).
136
The court also held the PFA tablets were not frozen or blocked assets, making TRIA inapplicable. 137 Finally, the court held § 1610(g) was not a freestanding immunity exception because the plaintiffs provided "virtually no support for their contention that Section 1610(g) expands the bases for attachment" and further, the plain language of the subsection did not support their assertion.
138
The plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit. First, drawing on support from the United States' amicus curiae brief in support of the appellees, and decisions of the Fifth, Second, and Ninth Circuits, the panel held that under § 1610(a), regardless of whether or not "academic study qualifies as a commercial use [,] . . . a foreign state may lose its execution immunity only by its own commercial use of its property in the United States."
141
In this case, the University of Chicago was using the property, not Iran.
142
Second, the panel held that TRIA did not apply because the PFA collection was "unblocked" property after President Carter's executive orders implementing the Algier Accords, and therefore, owned solely by Iran. 143 Finally, the panel held that § 1610(g) was not a freestanding exception to immunity, directly opposing the Ninth Circuit's holding in Bennett. 
145
The court concluded "subsection (g) permits a terror victim who wins a § 1605A judgment to execute on the property of the foreign state and the property of its agency or instrumentality 'as provided in this section' but 'regardless of' the five factors."
146
In addition to holding § 1610(g)(1)(A)-(E) were incorporated to remove the Bancec factors, the court also held that the language "as provided in this section" in § 1610(g) referred to the entirety of § 1610, not just § 1610(f) as the Bennett panel concluded.
147
The Seventh Circuit panel found that "as provided in this section" would be an unnecessary inclusion if § 1610(g) was a freestanding exception to execution immunity and thus the Bennett panel's reading would violate the "'cardinal principle' that a statute should be interpreted to avoid superfluity." (2) whether the entity's profits go to the government;
(B) whether the profits of the property go to that government; (3) the degree to which government officials manage the entity or otherwise have a hand in its daily affairs;
(C) the degree to which officials of that government manage the property or otherwise control its daily affairs; (4) whether the government is the real beneficiary of the entity's conduct; and (D) whether that government is the sole beneficiary in interest of the property; or (5) whether adherence to separate identities would entitle the foreign state to benefits in United States courts while avoiding its obligations.
(E) whether establishing the property as a separate entity would entitle the foreign state to benefits in United States courts while avoiding its obligations. Finally, the Rubin panel directly rebutted the Bennett majority's interpretation, stating that the Ninth Circuit's interpretation that § 1610(g) only applied to the preceding subsection, § 1610(f), pertaining to assets blocked by federal regulations was "highly strained." 150 While § 1610(f)(1)(A) denies immunity from attachment to financial assets of state terror sponsors "blocked" by the United States under other provisions, § 1610(f)(3) allows the President to "waive any provision of paragraph (1)" of § 1610(f) "in the interest of national security."
Id

151
Various Presidents have upheld a waiver of § 1610(f)(1) almost since its inclusion and this waiver has not been redacted or overridden and was in place when § 1610(g) was enacted.
152
Thus § 1610(f) has never been applied in any suit during § 1610(g)'s existence. The Seventh Circuit panel argued that because § 1610(f) "never became operative," § 1610(g) would "[make] no sense" if the phrase "in this section" only referred to § 1610(f).
153
The Rubin panel further found the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Gates and Wyatt was misplaced, as both cases left "the fundamental interpretive question about the scope of § 1610(g) . . . unexamined" and thus overruled the Seventh Circuit's decisions in these cases "to the extent that [the cases could] be read as holding that § 1610(g) is a freestanding exception to execution immunity for terrorism-related judgments." 155. In the Seventh Circuit, procedural rules dictate that when a panel creates a circuit split or overrules precedent, the opinion must automatically circulate within the entire court to determine "if a majority of active judges wish to rehear the case en banc." Id. at 489 (Hamilton, J., dissenting); see also supra note 15.
156. Rubin, 830 F.3d at 489-90 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
A. Language and Construction
The language and construction of § 1610(g) support the Rubin court's interpretation based on several different canons of construction. First, the traditional "plain meaning rule" dictates "the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain . . . the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms."
158
There is "no safer nor better settled canon of interpretation" than the "plain meaning rule." 159 Second, "expressio unius" is the "common sense language rule that the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of another thing," or that intentional inclusion indicates intentional omission as well. within a section, statute, or act. 161 Provisos, or specific conditions which must be met to appropriately apply a particular statute, often require analysis of context to determine under what circumstances they must be applied.
162
Although "traditionally, a proviso restricted only the section of the act to which it was attached, or the sections which preceded it," modern courts apply "a proviso to the entire act or a single section, depending on the legislature's intention or a meaning otherwise indicated." 163 As the court discussed in Rubin, and as I argue in this Comment, the plain language of the subsection at issue only suggests the removal of Bancec considerations when claims pertain to the state-sponsored terror exception to foreign sovereign immunity, § 1605A. 164 No language in § 1610(g) suggests the subsection is a freestanding immunity exception for attaching any property belonging to a state sponsor of terrorism, or its instrumentalities in the United States. Additionally, the phrase "as provided in this section" should be read broadly in reference to the entirety of § 1610 under the principal rules of statutory construction regarding "expressio unius" and provisos, and not narrowly as a reference only to § 1610(f). Applying § 1610(g) exclusively to § 1610(f), or considering § 1610(g) a freestanding immunity exception, would refer to § 1605A claims in § 1610(a) and (b), as well as other sections of the statute and provisions of law, inappropriately superfluous.
Disregarding the Bancec Factors
A literal reading of § 1610(g) suggests that the five factors of the subsection are a reference to the Bancec test. Both the Bennett and Rubin courts agree with this sentiment, but disagree about whether or not this is the only possible consequence of § 1610(g).
165
The Bancec doctrine is often applied when determining if immunity should be granted to separate juridical entities, regardless of whether immunity is denied for the sovereign to which they are an entity. 166 Nodding to the usual application of the Bancec factors, § 1610(g) expressly refers to "separate juridical 161 According to the common language rule, espressio unius, expressly including only the Bancec factors as considerations that courts should disregard when applying § 1610(g) indicates that these factors were the only potential concerns Congress wanted the courts to set aside when considering immunity from attachment for entities of state terror sponsors. If Congress intended § 1610(g) as a freestanding immunity exception, Congress was not limited to listing only the Bancec factors as considerations to disregard. Congress could have included additional subsections pursuant to § 1610(g)(1), asking courts to also disregard the "commercial use" requirements of § 1610(a) and (b), or the rest of § 1610, when allowing plaintiffs to attach the assets of state terror sponsors or their separate juridical entities, but it did not.
Alternatively, Congress could also have included the proviso "notwithstanding any other provision of law" in § 1610(g), as they did in TRIA § 201(a) and in § 1610(f). While Congress would still need to expressly include a list of Bancec factors because they are based on case law and not statutory provisions, including the language "notwithstanding any other provision of law" would make the Ninth Circuit panel's conclusion more appropriate. The omission of this phrase, or a similar phrase, indicates that the requirements of § 1610(a) and (b), as well as the rest of § 1610, still apply to claims pursuant to § 1610(g), even if the Bancec factors do not. opinion and Bennett dissent offer the more fundamentally persuasive argument-that "in this section" refers to the entirety of § 1610, not just § 1610(f). Both rely on the same "cardinal principle" of statutory construction-that a statute should be read to avoid making any "clause, sentence, or word" superfluous or unnecessary. 170 If § 1610(g) is construed only as a reference to the subsection preceding it as the Bennett majority suggests, Congress's inclusion of references to § 1605A in other sections would be unnecessary. 171 Section 1610(a)(7) denies immunity from attachment to property of foreign states used for commercial activity in the United States if "the judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign state is not immune under section 1605A or section 1605(a)(7) . . . ." If, as the Bennett court suggests, § 1610(g) is a freestanding exception to immunity, § 1610(g) would automatically govern all property that plaintiffs sought to attach pursuant to § 1605A, regardless of its "commercial use," and additional references to § 1605A in other sections of § 1610, including references in § 1610(a) and (b), would be unnecessary.
Furthermore, intepreting § 1610(g)'s "as provided in this section" language is a reference back to § 1610(f) is illogical, primarily because § 1610(f) was not operative at the time of § 1610(g)'s adoption, and has never been operative since. 174 Congress passed § 1610(g) only eight years after President Clinton waived § 1610(f) for the second time. 175 It is unlikely that Congress would pass an amendment dependent on subsection § 1610(f) which would be "effectively a nullity upon passage" because "Congress is presumed to legislate against the backdrop of the 'known state of laws.'" 176 Because § 1610(f) has never been operative, reading § 1610(g)'s grant of immunity "exception 'as provided in [ § 1610(f)]' would mean no execution at all." 177 Additionally, if § 1610(g) is to be considered a freestanding immunity exception, it is unlikely that it would need to refer back to a subsection that is in place, "notwithstanding any other provision of law," when neither subsection mentions the other expressly. To contend that a freestanding § 1610(g) refers to § 1610(f) would be saying that one independent immunity exception is in fact dependent on another to function. This cannot be the case.
Finally, Congress's word choice and lack of specificity in the phrase, "as provided in this section," is telling. The plain meaning of the word "section" implies a broader set of inclusions than the terms: "subsection;" "paragraph;" or "subparagraph," used in other portions of § 1610 and § 1610(g). 178 Additionally, many of the references within § 1610 to another "section" expressly refer to whole segments of law with the same level of specificity as the entirety of § 1610.
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"Section," as used in § 1610(g)'s phrase "as provided in this section," is more likely a reference to § 1610 as a whole, rather than another unspecified subsection of § 1610. Instead of adopting the Bennett court's interpretation, courts should read "in this section" as referring to the entirety of § 1610 as the Rubin panel did and the United States as amicus suggested in both Rubin and Bennett.
In effect, the Rubin reading would require attachments under § 1610(g) to also have a "commercial use" under § 1610(a) or (b), or to comply with another subsection of § 1610 before § 1610(g) privileges could apply. Essentially, only when (1) the property at issue belongs to a foreign state, sued pursuant to the state-sponsored terrorism exception, § 1605A; and (2) the same property is subject to attachment "as provided" under subsections § 1610(a)-(f), would § 1610(g) be applicable to alleviate the Bancec factor analysis. This would be the appropriate application of the "cardinal principles of statutory construction" and alleviate the issues of reading superfluity and unintended consequences into § 1610(g).
B. The Intent of § 1610(g)
Both the Rubin and Bennett panels agreed that Congress included § 1610(g) in the 2008 NDAA as a response to the ongoing struggles terror victims had in attempting to execute their court ordered judgments against Iran.
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While there is no doubt Congress sought to make this process easier for sympathetic plaintiffs, the courts disagreed about how much Congress intended to abrogate the preexisting requirements for attachment. 181 While the Rubin court's reading of § 1610(g) suggests a less extreme step toward easing attachment requirements for terror victims, this reading is substantially more prudent than the Bennett panel's interpretation, particularly in light of the assets at issue in Rubin.
Under the Bennett court's interpretation of § 1610(g), "any and all Iranian property in the United States" could be attached to aid in execution of a terror victim's judgment. 182 The courts have already limited attachment under § 1610(g) by holding that a "plain reading of § 1610(g) offers no indication that Congress intended to eliminate the immunity that has long been afforded to diplomatic properties . . . ." 183 Therefore, § 1610(g) cannot allow for the attachment of all Iranian property because particular property maintains immunity for diplomatic purposes. 184 While the Ninth Circuit's interpretation would provide more attachable assets for terror victim plaintiffs to apply toward their judgments, this reading goes against case precedent that limits the kinds of assets that can be seized.
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The Rubin court's reading of § 1610(g), by contrast, benefits plaintiffs by simply removing the presumed Bancec factor considerations generally required to attach separate juridical entities of a foreign sovereign in aid of execution.
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Allowing for the attachment of separate juridical entities, like Bank Melli, without requiring that the entity meets one of the Bancec exceptions opens up potential attachment options not permissible prior to the 2008 NDAA. 187 That the United States, through amicus briefs filed in both Bennett and Rubin, agrees with the Rubin panel is also a strong indication the majority in Rubin has correctly interpreted Congress's intent to simply remove the generally required application of Bancec under §1610(g).
"unexamined premise." 195 Neither case required a deep analysis of § 1610(g) because other provisions of the FSIA provided for attachment of the assets of foreign state sponsors of terror sought by the plaintiffs in those cases. 196 By overruling Gates and Wyatt to the extent that they could be understood as "holding that § 1610(g) [was] a freestanding exception to execution immunity for terrorism-related judgments," the panel correctly maintained the primary holdings of the cases and attempted to prevent future misunderstanding of § 1610(g). 197 While even partially overruling Seventh Circuit precedent may be procedurally problematic in this case, the panel acted appropriately here because the primary holdings and judgments in both cases remain. 198 
D. Public Policy Concerns
In cases like Rubin and Bennett courts often find themselves in scenarios similar to those Dr. Jones faces throughout the Indiana Jones movies-forced to choose between a pit filled with poisonous snakes and a room full of creepy-crawly beetles. On one hand, the courts aim to support terror victims by helping provide justice and compensation for their suffering; on the other hand, courts are forced to consider the educational, political, and diplomatic ramifications of denying foreign state-sponsors of terror immunity, seizing their assets, or sometimes, allowing their cultural treasures to be sold off to the highest bidder who may not fully appreciate their worth. The FSIA seeks to ameliorate some of the "case-by-case diplomatic pressures" associated with cases like Rubin and Bennett, but simply cannot remove them all. 199 In these kinds of cases it is essential for courts to consider issues of public policy. Here, the Seventh Circuit appropriately read § 1610(g) to protect the PFA tablets and allow them to remain where they can generate the most value to society. 200 When comparing the decisions of Bennett and Rubin, it is important to first compare the kinds of assets each set of plaintiffs attempted to attach to satisfy their judgment. In Bennett, the plaintiffs sought financial assets, a standard form of compensatory or punitive damages in civil suits. 201 Money is commonplace and not imbued with any sentimental, academic, or cultural value. Unlike the antiquities sought by the plaintiffs in Rubin, financial assets are not something that can be entirely lost or destroyed and never replaced. In fact, due to the nature of financial assets sought in Bennett, the Ninth Circuit was not required to consider § 1610(g) at all. The financial remedy the Bennett plaintiffs sought was reachable under the TRIA § 201(a), "notwithstanding any other provision of law." 202 Because there was no question the TRIA allowed for the attachment of Iranian assets blocked or frozen by the U.S. government, which included the Visa and Franklin funds, the Ninth Circuit did not need to look elsewhere or redefine other areas of the law, like § 1610(g), to reach the plaintiffs' objective. 203 Unlike money, antiquities, and in particular the PFA tablets sought by the Rubin plaintiffs, are unique and irreplaceable. Not only do the PFA tablets include some of the oldest writings in the world, but they are also held by the institution that can most likely best utilize them. 204 The University of Chicago's Oriental Institute is one of the few academic institutions in the world with so many scholars versed in Persian history and able to read the nearly dead Elamite language. 205 Additionally, unlike most financial assets, it is entirely impossible to replace historical artifacts like those in the PFA collection, important to Iranian citizens and global scholars alike. If the Rubin plaintiffs were to be awarded the PFA tablets, they would likely sell them, perhaps to buyers who would not, or could not, provide the same level of care as the University of Chicago.
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In addition, according to scholars, the collection is best viewed as a whole rather than in fragments. 207 Selling off parts of the collection could destroy the historical integrity and academic value of the collection, undoing the eighty years of scholarly inquiry pursued by the Oriental Institute, and causing the collection to, both metaphorically and perhaps physically, crumble. 208 Historically, the United States has both aimed to maintain diplomacy and sometimes repair broken diplomatic relationships with other nations through the preservation of antiquities. One simple step toward maintaining these goals would be to adopt the Seventh Circuit's understanding of the FSIA § 1610(g), which is also supported by the United States. 209 The ramifications of allowing plaintiffs to seize "national treasures" like the PFA tablets would be severe and counterproductive in repairing connections with Iran, and maintaining relationships with nations around the globe. Today, the United States, through the IFSA, seeks to protect artifacts on loan from foreign nations, like the PFA tablets, from judicial proceedings in the United States. 210 Unfortunately, because IFSA was enacted long after Iran loaned the PFA collection to the United States in 1936, there is no current legislation protecting the tablets. 211 The courts, however, can protect the PFA tablets through the appropriate, limited interpretation of § 1610(g). If the United States allowed attachment of the PFA tablets to satisfy the Rubins' judgment, it would likely set a negative example internationally. Seeing the United States attach antiquities could make other nations less likely to loan their artifacts to the United States in the future, a devastating blow to international cultural understanding and its global diplomacy. While the United States has long been at political odds with Iran, in part due to the nation's support of terror attacks on U.S. citizens, taking away objects of cultural significance would punish not only Iran, but the likely innocent scholars, nationally and internationally, who might seek to study the PFA tablets. 214 Consider § 1610(g)(3), which aims to protect against "the impairment of an interest held by a person who is not liable in the action giving rise to a judgment in property subject to attachment in aid of execution." 215 While § 1610(g)(3) does not apply to Rubin because the Oriental Institute holds no valid property right to the tablets, only a temporary right to possession while the tablets are on loan, the Oriental Institute does maintain a strong interest in the preservation and protection of the collection for academic purposes.
Though the potential seizure of the PFA tablets arose under a very specific set of circumstances, the likelihood of similar circumstances arising in the future may continue to grow in light of the Justice Against State Sponsors of Terror Act. 216 The Act particularly denies immunity "from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in any case in which money damages are sought" to countries supporting specified terror acts against the U.S. 217 Although the Saudi Arabian assets available in the United States are likely less scarce and intrinsically different from those of Iran, it is almost certain that battles over Saudi Arabian valuable antiquities, like the Iranian PFA tablets, could arise in the near future if Saudi Arabia, like Iran, refuses to pay judgments held against them. 218 Adopting the Rubin court's view would protect only a very narrow kind of property, only that which is not commercially used, while permitting plaintiffs to bypass the Bancec doctrine to reach assets of separate juridical entities of state sponsors of terror.
IV. RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND MOVING FORWARD
Moving forward, the Rubin interpretation of § 1610(g) could be nationally applied in two ways. First, the Legislature could act to amend the language in segments of the FSIA to clarify § 1610(g)'s intended purpose. Alternatively, the Supreme Court could adopt the Seventh Circuit's interpretation. Parties in both cases have filed petitions for writs of certiorari.
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The Rubin petition, filed by the plaintiffs, asked the Court to clarify § 1610(g) and § 1610(a), while the Bennett petition, filed by the defendant Bank Melli, only sought clarification of § 1610(g). 220 In June 2017, the Court granted certiorari to address only the meaning of § 1610(g).
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The Court will likely wait to take further action in Bennett until Rubin has been decided on the merits. 222 V. CONCLUSION After years of struggling his way through trains of wild animals, surviving dramatic fights with thieves and miscreants, and narrowly avoiding certain death by escaping a sinking, later exploding, ship Indiana Jones eventually placed Coronado's crucifix into the hands of a museum curator.
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While Jones's plight makes for great cinema, we should not require foreign sovereigns or American museums seeking to preserve historical artifacts to jump through judicial hoops to retain their cultural treasures against court orders. The Rubin panel's reading of § 1610(g), limiting § 1610(g) to merely removing the Bancec requirements usually applied to separate juridical entities and not serving as a "free-standing immunity exception," should be nationally implemented in order to prevent the seizure of cultural antiquities in the future. Based on the language and structure, Congressional intent, the propriety of overruling Seventh Circuit precedent, and the policy concerns associated with § 1610(g), the Rubin reading is a more appropriate balance between providing foreign sovereign immunity and compensating terror victims for their suffering.
